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„Now a direct question, Mr. President: What is exactly the so-called Castle 
policy about which one speaks and writes?" 
„I do not know exactly what anyone understands by this word. There is no 
Castle policy in the sense that I or some circle of people under my leadership 
would conduct some policy outside of the Constitution and parliament. I háve 
my political convictions just as does every citizen, and as president I háve my 
duties as defined by the Constitution. I háve nevěr hidden my convictions, and 
I háve always understood my obligations in such a way that I am to speak 
openly with the government and with the leaders of the political parties about 
that which concerns us in common. Sometimes they háve convinced me, sometimes 
I háve convinced them. That is all there is to the Castle policy." 
Such was Tomáš G. Masaryk's characterization of the policy of the Castle in 
an interview published in the Národní osvobození on June 27, 1926. The inter­
view appeared at a time when the Czechoslovak national coalition, which had 
ruled the country essentially since its founding, was breaking apart. The socio-
economic and ideological cleavages among the Czechoslovak parties were finding 
expression in increasingly divergent political policies. Given political fragmen-
tation among the Czechs, the concept of the „Castle" was assuming new signi-
ficance as an expression for one of the competing political groupings. Referring 
to the forces around Masaryk, the word was an allusion to the location of the 
Presidenťs office and official residence in Prague Castle. But the concept was 
as nebulous to contemporaries then as it is to historians today. Masaryk did not 
define the Castle in his response to the journalisťs question, and it was clear 
that he wished not to discuss the possibility of a political alliance under his 
leadership. In his answer one sees only a president with deep convictions actively 
counseling with the country's political leaders about affairs of statě. 
Actually Masaryk's response might be more enlightening about the nature of 
the Castle than would appear at first glance. That which Masaryk emphasized 
was his ideas and convictions, and if one is to develop a working definition of 
the Castle one must pay primary attention to the ideological commitments of 
its adherents. Since the First World War Masaryk's all-consuming goal had been 
the creation and development of a sovereign Czechoslovak statě as a liberal 
democracy with progressive social welfare legislation. For Masaryk, it was 
essential that the new order be in harmony with modern political and social 
philosophy, specifically with the ideas of Wilsonian liberalism, which had pro-
vided the principál intellectual ballast of the Paris peace settlement. The statě 
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would find its internal strength in the loyalty of its Citizens and its external 
security in association with like-minded countries. For Masaryk, the national, 
social, and democratic ideas blended into his special vision of the Czechoslovak 
republic. 
No man was more indefatigable in his dedication to Masaryk's idea of the 
Czechoslovak State than was Edvard Beneš. As the arbiter of the country's 
foreign policy throughout its existence, Beneš saw in the League of Nations and 
the ideas of the New Diplomacy the international equivalent of the liberal 
regime at home. He became a fixture in Geneva, accustoming diplomats to the 
name Czechoslovakia, associating his country with the collective security pro-
jects of the day. Like his mentor a practical man, however, Beneš believed that 
the security of the country depended on reliable alliances. Ultimately that pointed 
Czechoslovakia toward France and the other states of the Little Entente as the 
only viable choices available at the time. Within Czechoslovakia Beneš was uni-
versally respected for his expertise in diplomacy, but he was widely resented for 
his youth, his seeming arrogance, and his obvious ambition. Without Masaryk's 
unflagging support, in all likelihood Beneš would not have remained foreign 
minister in the 1920's or have succeeded to the presidency in 1935. Masaryk's 
protection of a man so different in temperament can be explained only by 
Benes's unshakable commitment to the Czechoslovak republic as conceived by 
Masaryk. Masaryk and Beneš became the poles upon which the Castle group 
revolved. The gravitational force holding the group together was their common 
commitment to the young republic — its liberal democratic political systém and 
social reform legislation at home, its pro-Western orientation abroad. 
The Castle included sympathizers from all the major Czechoslovak political 
parties. At the core of the Masaryk-Beneš forces in the republic stood the 
parties of the moderate left. Particularly after the ouster of Jiří Stříbrný in 
1926, the Czechoslovak National Socialist party followed Benes's leadership and 
supported Castle policies despite the occasional restlessness of more nationalistic 
elements in the party. Masaryk and the Czechoslovak Social Democrats were in 
generál philosophical agreement. The building of the right-of-center „gentlemen's" 
coalition in 1926, which excluded those two parties, was therefore a setback for 
the Castle, even though that same coalition did bring Sudeten-German parties 
into the government for the first time. And the early reconstruction of the 
government in 1929, by which the National Socialists and the Social Democrats 
returned to the coalition, was engineered largely by Masaryk and Beneš. 
But the political influence of the Castle was not confined simply to the 
leftist parties. Masaryk sought confidants through a broad range of parties and 
interest groups. The chief of the presidential chancellery, Přemysl Šámal, acted 
as a clearing house for the information flowing to the president and thereby 
occupied a position of considérable influence in the administration. Groups that 
cooperated dosely with the Castle could also be found in the parties of the 
center and the moderate right. The dominant faction of the Czechoslovak 
Agrarians under premiers Antonín Švehla, František Udržal, and Jan Malypetr 
could be counted as political alliés of Masaryk and Beneš despite conflicting 
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viewpoints on tariff issues in particular *. Although anti-clerical attitudes were in 
füll evidence in the Castle, the Czechoslovak People's party attained a close 
working relationship with the Castle in the latě 1920's. That occurred simul-
taneously with the diplomatic rapprochement between the Vatican and the 
Czechoslovak government, approximately at the samé time as Monsignor Šrámek 
was functioning as acting prime minister during Svehla's illness in 1928. On the 
right wing, the National Democratic party certainly could not be considered 
part of the Castle so long as it followed the leadership of Karel Kramář. In 
terms of parliamentary delegates the National Democratic party was weak. For 
a time, however, it included some of the best minds in the country inasmuch as 
it was the heir of several prewar parties, the most important of which were the 
Young Czechs. Among the National Democrats there were also factions that 
desired closer Cooperation with the Masaryk-Beneš forces, and the possibilities 
and limits of that Cooperation are the subject of this páper. 
The support for the Castle from the major Czechoslovak parties covering a 
wide political spectrum illustrates the basic fact that the Castle commanded the 
broad middle ground of Czechoslovak political life. Conciliation was its basic 
methodology, and consensus its aim. Its policies offered enough to every major 
interest group that no social class or national group was completely and per-
manently excluded from its counsels. Only the extreme elements in political life 
remained permanently outside. It has been observed that the composition of the 
Castle group was constantly changing. That is true, but the reason for the change 
lay not in any basic shift in Castle policies. The course charted by Masaryk and 
Beneš remained remarkably steady throughout the twenty-year existence of the 
first republic. Rather, membership in the Castle depended on the degree to 
which any particular group was willing in changing circumstances to compromise 
some of its interests in order to cooperate in consensus politics. 
To what extent was the Czechoslovak financial Community willing to follow 
the lead of the Castle? Although bitter rivalries split the Community, the most 
influential single individual in the world of Czechoslowak finance was Jaroslav 
Preiss. His position as generál director of the Živnostenská Bank placed him at 
the head of the country's largest bank, whose interests extended into practically 
every branch of industry and commerce2. Given the dominance of banking 
institutions over Czechoslovak industry, Preiss was far more than just a banker. 
1
 Concerning Agrarian Cooperation with the Castle in the latc 1920's, notě two articles 
by U h l í ř , Dušan: Republikánská strana lidu zemědělského a malorolnického ve 
vládě panské koalice [Die republikanische Partei d. Landwirte und Kleinbauern unter 
der Regierung der Herrenkoalition]. ČSČH 18 (1970) 195—236. — Konec vlády 
panské koalice a republikánská strana v roce 1929 [Das Ende der Regierung der Her­
renkoalition und die republ. Partei im Jahre 1929]. CSČH 18 (1970) 551—592. 
2
 For a summary of the Zivnobank's industrial interests, see: W a g n e r , Richard: 
Panství kapitalistických monopolů v Československu [Die Herrschaft der kapitalisti­
schen Monopole in der Tschechoslowakei]. Státní nakladatelství politické literatury. 
Prague 1958, pp. 230—234. For Preiss's concept of banks as the foundation for in­
dustrial enterprises, see: P r e i s s , Jaroslav: Průmysl a banky [Industrie u. Banken]. 
Prague 1912. 
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He served on the boards of directors of more than forty firms, and he became 
the main figuře in the Central Federation of Czechoslovak Industrialists. In the 
relatively small circle of the Czechoslovak political, financial, and intellectual 
elitě, Preiss was one of the stellar personalities. His personal friendships and 
associations made it possible for him to wield the influence of his bank without 
excessive public exposure. H e was on close terms with Masaryk and Beneš. But 
insofar as Preiss was associated with formal politics, it was with KramáPs 
National-Democratic party, which was generally recognized as the represen-
tative of upper-level financial and industrial interests. The politics of the Castle, 
on the other hand, leaned to the left, and no narrow definition of the Castle 
could possible encompass the National-Democratic party as a whole. The rela-
tionship of Jaroslav Preiss and the interests that he represented with the circles around 
Masaryk and Beneš therefore offers a test čase for determining the elasticity of 
the concept of the Castle. To what extent can Jaroslav Preiss and the Živnostenská 
Bank be counted as members of the Castle group? In what ways did that 
association change during the twenty years of the first republic? Ultimately, 
what does the interaction of high finance and high politics reveal about the way 
in which Czechoslovakia was actually goveřned? Those questions provide the 
foundation for this páper. 
I : 1918—1923 
The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 created a unique opportunity 
for state-building in Central Europe. The challenge of creating a new national 
statě in the Czech lands, Slovakia, and Ruthenia united Czechs from various 
social classes into a common front in the early years of the republic. Although 
contemporary historians in Czechoslovakia customarily emphasize social conflict 
in the republic, and particularly the abortive generál strike of December 1920, 
mass demonstrations of social unrest were largely the result of a struggle for 
power between the moderate and the radical leaders of the socialist movement. 
Genuine populär enthusiasm for the new statě mitigated social discontent in the 
broad masses of the population. Czech financiers and banks were an essential 
element in the national coalition, particularly in the formulation and imple-
mentation of financial and economic policy. N o other institution was so im-
portant as the Živnostenská Bank, and no other private individual could match 
the influence of Jaroslav Preiss. 
At the age of forty-seven, Preiss had already fashioned a highly successful 
career in finance and journalism at the time of the proclamation of the republic. 
Born the son of a disttict judge in Přešticy, Preiss studied law at the universities 
of Prague and Leipzig, and became an economic editor for the Národní listy in 
1900. In 1902 Preiss began to function as secretary for the Association of Czech 
Textile Industrialists. He entered the employ of the Živnostenská Bank in 1907 
in order to edit the bank's Finanční listy and to organize the industrial mortgage 
division of the institution. In 1908 he became a deputy in the Bohemian Landtag 
for the National Freethinkers' party. Perhaps most helpful for his reputation 
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during the first republic was the fact that Preiss was arrested and jailed by the 
Austrian authorities in June 1916 for high treason and crimes against the military 
power of the Habsburg Empire. Upon his pardon by the emperor in July 1917, 
Preiss was named generál director of the Zivnobank. That position, which he 
held throughout the first republic, was the fundamental basis for his influence 
and prestige, although he functioned in many other capacities as well8. 
Nothing eise quite so legitimized an individual's claim to leadership in the 
first republic as did active service in the „national liberation" movement during 
the First World War. From the beginning of his career Preiss had been inevitably 
associated with the revival of Czech nationalism through his financial and 
journalistic activity. Loyalty to his bank necessarily implied support of Czech 
economic development, and the financing of new Czech economic enterprises 
engendered in him both professional and national pride 4 . During the war the 
Zivnobank struggled to preserve that portion of the Czech national wealth which 
it controlled or influenced, and its policies were damaging to the Austrian war 
effort. The basic goal of the bank was to minimize the amount of Czech capital 
available to the Austrian government. Personnel of the bank barely concealed 
their negative attitude to the Austrian war loans, and Czech participation in 
the loans was minimal. On the other hand, the bank warmly recommended local 
bonds issued in Bohemia and Moravia. The bank also undertook to buy Russian 
currency, bonds, and Stocks, often through the medium of Swiss or Dutch banks. 
The prosecution in Preiss's trial in 1916 accurately characterized the bank's policies 
as a speculation on a Russian victory in the war 5 . Before the war Preiss had 
already shown that he shared the Neo-Slavist sympathies of Karel Kramář. In 
the early years of the war Zivnobank transactions reflected the pro-Russian 
enthusiasm that spread through a portion of the Czech population. 
As the pace of Czech political activity quickened during the last year of the 
war, Preiss entered the inner circles in Prague that began to chart an economic 
program for an independent Czechoslovak State. In May and June 1918 he 
helped to found the Central Federation of Czech Industrialists, stressing that it 
was necessary for Czech industry to have an Organization representing its interests 
just as did German and Polish industrialists. By the autumn the federation 
claimed more than 900 member firms, and in the closing weeks of the war it 
3
 Národní listy, December 7, 1930. Prager Presse, December 7, 1930. 
4
 On the growth of the Živnostenská Bank and its contribution to the development of 
Czech industry in the last quartercentury of the Empire, see: H o r á k , Josef: Přehled 
vývoje českých obchodních bank [Überblick über die Entwicklung der tschechischen 
Handelsbank]. Prague 1913, pp. 117—152. 
5
 This information is taken from portions of the legal indictment of Preiss, which was 
reprinted in: Das Verhalten der Tschechen im Weltkrieg. Vienna 1918, pp. 106—140. 
I am indebted tö Mr. Oswald Kostrba-Skalicky for calling this source to my attention. 
The book was published under German-National auspices as anti-Czech propaganda, 
but it was in agreement with later Czech depictions of their wartime struggle for 
national liberation. See: P i m p e r , A n t o n í n : České obchodní banky za války a 
po válce [Die tschechischen Handelsbanken vor und nach dem Krieg]. Prague 1929, 
pp. 53, 64—66, 79—81. 
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urged those firms to withhold their normal contributions from the various 
commercial organizations in Vienna. Soon after the proclamation of Czechoslovak 
independence on October 28, 1918, the Národní výbor, which had assumed 
temporary responsibility for governing the country, informed the federation that 
all regulations concerning industrial production would be publicized through 
the federation itself8. The Central Federation of Czech Industrialists therefore 
played a mediatory role between the political authorities and the individual 
industrialists and thereby contributed to an orderly exercise of authority even 
though little governmental apparatus existed in the early dáys of the republic. 
Planning economic programs for the republic and founding organizations that 
helped to effect them was a profitable as well as patriotic service for Preiss and 
the Živnostenská Bank. The minutes of the executive Council of the Zivnobank 
noted on November 6, 1918: „In recent days a striking change has occurred in 
the normal pattern of our business. From day to day our clients are multiplying 
as far as savings deposits, generál accounts, and the deposit of valuable papers 
are concerned. Also, in the industrial and trust divisions corporations and firms, 
whose business we only recently tried in vain to win, are now approaching us." 7 
The growth of the Zivnobank was in fact phenomenal. At the outbreak of the 
war the share capital of the bank had stood at 80 million crowns; in 1919 it 
was 200 million. Its balances more than quadrupled between 1914 and 1918; its 
profits doubled; and its dividends increased from 10 to 24 crowns per share8. 
Even allowing for the effects of wartime inflation the figures were impressive. 
Those for 1918 were particularly strong inasmuch as they reflected the growth 
of Czech banking activity during the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Other Czech banks enjoyed a similar rate of growth, but inasmuch as the Zivno­
bank alreády entered the war as the leading Czech financial institution its 
absolute dominance increased as a result of the wartime expansion. 
The financial strength of the Zivnobank undoubtedly exerted a magnetic 
attraction on corporate and private depositors. But the solid political connections 
of the bank were fundamental for its growth and development. Some years later 
the České slovo recalled the upheaval of 1918 in a basically laudatory article 
about Preiss — „At that time just before the end of the war, a lucky stroke 
brought success for Preiss: After the famous audience with Emperor Charles, 
Klofáč met with Preiss in Vienna and informed him of his [Klofáč's] strong 
opinion that even the Emperor had already lost faith in the existence of Austria. 
Dr. Preiss immediately went to the Vienna branch of the Zivnobank and gave 
6
 Státní ústřední archiv. Ústřední svaz československých průmyslníků, carton 10, Mi­
nutes of mcetings of May 31, September 18, and October 18, 1918. SÚA, ÚSČP, car­
ton 24, Letter from the Národní výbor (signed by Alois Rašín, Jiří Stříbrný, Fran­
tišek Soukup, and Antonín Švehla) to the Ústřední svaz českých průmyslníků, Octo­
ber 30, 1918. 
7
 Protocol of the meeting of the executive Council of the Živnostenská banka, Novem­
ber 6, 1918. Quoted by S t r h á n , Milan: Živnostenská banka na Slovensku v rokoch 
1918—1938. HČ 15 (1967) 178—179. 
8
 P i m p e r : České obchodní banky 61, 124—125, 141. 
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the order to evacuate all cash and assests from the Vienna branch to Prague. 
Before that, in relation to Austro-Hungarian banks the Zivnobank was only a 
debtor, nevěr a creditor. So it happened that within a few days when Austria 
feil apart — at the time Preiss was in Geneva where, along with the Czech 
delegation, he had a meeting with Dr. Beneš — the Živnostenská Bank did not 
have a cent in Vienna." 9 Certainly access to the information of political insiders 
helped the directors of the bank make shrewd decisions. 
No politicain was more valuable to the bank than the first minister of finance, 
Alois Rašín. Next to Karel Kramář the most influential member of the National-
Democratic party, he was a close associate of Preiss. Rašín was credited with the 
basic decision upon which the financial stability of the republic rested. In order 
to combat the inflationary effects of the Viennese governmenťs constant resort 
to the printing presses, Rašín ordered in February 1919 the closing of the 
Czechoslovak frontier, the stamping of all currency, and the drastic reduction of 
the amount of money in circulation. That step established a separate Czecho­
slovak currency and became the point of departure for the economic stabilization 
of the new republic. But it was subsequently rumored that the Zivnobank 
exploited its prior knowledge of Rasin's measure in order to import large amounts 
of Austrian banknotes and securities, to have them stamped as Czechoslovak 
exchange, and thereby to make a huge profit at the expense of the government1 0. 
Regardless of the validity of such charges, it is certain that the government 
and the Zivnobank cooperated dosely in the formative years of the republic. 
Their common goal was the emancipation of Czechoslovak economic life from 
German influence. That involved the establishment of a strong banking systém 
in Prague independent of the traditional Viennese center and the securing of the 
shares of Czechoslovak industrial enterprises that were in German hands. A 
piece of correspondence between Beneš and Preiss during the Paris peace Con­
ference illustrates that policy. On February 24, 1919, Preiss wrote to Beneš: 
My Friend! 
Permit me to communicate the following to you with my heartiest greetings. 
Among the industrialists who have come to Paris are Mr. Engineer Adolf 
Kamberský, a representative of the Škoda Works, and Mr. Director J. Pokorný, 
a representative of the United Machine Works. 
Both of these companies have been hitherto under the influence of the Viennese 
banks, and the composition of their boards of directors has been predominantly, 
indeed almost exclusively German. The negotiations with the Škoda Works, 
about which I have also informed you, are nearing an end, and we have also 
been negotiating with the United Machine Works about a reorganization, which 
in my opinion will reach the desired goal. This reorganization will be completed 
in short order, and these enterprises will be czechized. At the moment, of course, 
the matter is not finished, because it is still necessary to complete the appraisals 
9
 České slovo, December 6, 1930. 
1 0
 Rudé právo, February 20, 1938. 
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at the Škoda Works. I think, however, that the unfinished status is not an 
obstacle for the firms to represent themselves as Czech enterprises. 
In the composition of the boards of directors there will be a considérable 
majority of Czechs. However, a representative of the Bohemian Germans will 
be admitted too inasmuch as the enterprises are partly dependent on them as 
far as supplies are concerned. Perhaps we will also také in some Jugoslav, which 
certainly would not be an obstacle to us. I také it as my duty to inform you in 
this way. 
Here in Prague there is nothing fundamentally new. Your messages I have 
precisely communicated to the gentlemen, and you can certainly see from the 
correspondence with them that I have informed them quite correctly. The plans 
of Mr. Dr. Kramář concerning the Russian question cannot be realized, and an 
agreement has been reached already about the way in which we should proceed 
in this matter. The government will inform you directly. 
I am glad that I can stay in Prague, and I am very glad that the represen-
tatives of the American banks are Coming over here so that we can finish 
negotiations with them. 
If you need me, of course, I am at your service. 
Otherwise things in Prague are quiet except for the usual effervescence. 
Personally I view the Situation here calmly if we have enough food supplies. 
Food supplies of all kinds should be given prime consideration inasmuch as the 
entire development in our country depends on that question. Therefore I have 
heard with great pleasure that you are concentrating mostly on this question. 
That is correct, for without a Solution of this problém there is no peace and also 
no further development with us. 
Yours devotedly, 
Dr. Preiss1 1 
That letter, and others like it, affords rarely available documentary evidence 
from the Prague archives of the close working relationship between Preiss and 
the political leaders of the country. It also illustrates the national economic 
policies of the young republic. The generál effort to gain control over industrial 
and commercial enterprises was popularly known as the „nostrification" pro­
gram. That policy continued throughout the first republic, although it was most 
intense in the early years of independence. The effort to bring industrial enter­
prises into Czech hands very often meant putting them under the influence of 
the Zivnobank, and the bank could count on governmental support for its 
projects as long as German influence would be minimal. Illustrative of this 
Situation are four separate business projects about which the Zivnobank ap-
proached the government in 1919 and 1920. 
In December 1919 the Zivnobank wrote to the Ministry of Industry, Trade 
1 1
 Ministerstvo zahraničnich věci, 80/8529, Letter from Preiss to Beneš, February 24, 1919. 
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and Commerce informing it of the possibility of acquiring majority control of 
the Bantlin'sche chemische Industrie, A. g. The concern was Reich-German and 
depended on wood in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The Zivnobank 
outlined the desirability of having this important component of the chemical 
industry in Czech hands inasmuch as the company produced aceton, which was 
ušed in the making of gun powder. The Zivnobank sought pledges from the 
government that wood from statě forests would remain available to run the fac-
tories. After Conferences among various ministries, the government gave the 
desired assurances. On this basis, the Zivnobank responded that it had made 
arrangements to acquire 56 %> of the shares of the company 1 2. 
In 1920, resulting at least in part from government initiative, the Zivnobank 
proposed the establishment of a company for mining and refining uncommon 
metals such as nickel, copper, radium, and tin. The ChanCellery of the President 
of the Republic in a letter to the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Commerce 
on May 14, 1920, strongly backed the project to the point of urging statě sub-
ventions for the company. Masaryk's office stressed the need to curtail depen­
dence on Germany, which had traditionally refined much of the ore. Given the 
support of the presidential chancellery, the Ministry also approved the project1 3. 
Also in April and May 1920, there was no trouble winning cabinet approval for 
a Zivnobank project to form a company for the import and export of textile 
products. Besides regulating trade in textiles and raw materials, the company 
was supposed to strengthen the Czechoslovak balance of payments by exporting 
to those countries that could pay in hard currency1 4. 
On the other hand, the Zivnobank encountered government Opposition to any 
project that appeared to run counter to the „nostrification" program. In 1920 
the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, the Ministry of the Interior, 
and the Ministry of Finance delayed approval for the establishment of a company 
to produce cooking and table oils because Czech concerns would apparently 
control only 5 °/o of the stock whereas Viennese interests would own 45 °/o. When 
the Zivnobank protested that Czech capital would actually own 36 °/o and that 
Czechs would be dominant in the management of the company, the government 
gave its reluctant agreement. At the samé time, however, the Ministry of In­
dustry
 s
 Trade, and Commerce proposed an inter-ministry Conference to formulate 
policy concerning the establishment of business enterprises in which Czech capital 
played a minor role 1 5. German or Austrian investments were clearly unwelcome 
in Czechoslovakia. 
The young republic sorely needed credits and investments from abroad, 
however, and it naturally turned to those Western powers that had been instru­
mental in the foundation of the republic. State loans were floated in France, 
Britain, and the United States, and Czechoslovak diplomacy encouraged private 
investments from those countries in Czechoslovakia. A calculation of Benes's 
1 2
 SÚA, Ministerstvo průmyslu, obchodu, a živností. Fascikl. 20.092/20. Krabice 315. 
" SÚA, MPOZ, Fascikl. 21.096/20, Krabice 334. 
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 SÚA, MPOZ, Fascikl. 18.920/20, Krabice 331. 
1 5
 SÚA, MOP2, Fascikl. 42.776/20, Krabice 332. 
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foreign policy was that Western financial investments in Czechoslovakia would 
strengthen the interests of the Western powers in supporting the independence 
of the young republic. Whereas the Zivnobank entered into Joint business ventures 
with Western firms, there always existed an element of friction between that 
aspect of Czechoslovak diplomacy and the interests of the Zivnobank. Already in 
1919 the bank promoted a project by which it would be the sole private par-
ticipant in a statě monopoly over the explosives industry. Rašín, as Minister 
of Finance, backed the proposal, but Beneš suggested French and British parti-
cipation as well. The ultimate resolution of the question divided the shares in 
the monopoly among a number of participants, with the Zivnobank owning only 
15 °/o of the stock whereas British-French interests controlled 40 % 1 6 . Rivalries 
between the Zivnobank and Western Investors continued in later years of the 
republic. 
In addition to the „nostrification" program, the effort to establish a strong 
and stable Czechoslovak currency reflected the generál Community of interests 
between the government and the Živnostenská Bank. In the early years of the 
republic the Ministry of Finance was a preserve of the National-Democratic 
party. There existed no national bank at the time, and monetary policy was 
determined by the Bank Office of the Ministry of Finance. No one was more 
fervently committed to the establishment of a sound currency than was Alois 
Rašín, who functioned as the country's first minister of finance until the Natio-
nal-Democrats left the coalition in July 1919. Rasin's major competitor as a 
financial expert among active politicians was Karel Engliš, a professor from 
Brno. Engliš was also a National Democrat. He belonged, however, to the 
party's left-wing, which crystallized after the party's exit from the government in 
1919, and he eventually abandoned even a formal identification with the party. 
He was a favorite of Masaryk, and he was to become known as the leading 
spokesman on financial matters for the Castle. It was largely because of Masaryk's 
prodding that Engliš became minister of finance in May 1920, although Preiss 
helped to make the appointment possible by overcoming conservative Opposition 
within the National-Democratic party 1 7 . 
In the early years of the republic, governments changed frequently, and the 
typical tenure of a minister of finance was little more than a few months. At 
the same time the exchange rates for the Czechoslovak crown on international 
money markets fluctuated widely. In Zürich the crown readied a value of 34 
Swiss Centimes in May 1919 before plunging all the way to five Centimes in 
February 1920. Recovering to 12.7 Centimes in June, it settled in a ränge between 
7.5 and 8.5 Centimes for several months in 1920 and 1921 m. The instability of 
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the crown obviously severely hampered Czechoslovak foreign trade, upon which 
the country's economy was largely dependent. Whereas it was widely believed 
in Prague that the crown was undervalued, the fundamental demand among 
the public was for the stabilization of the crown at some constant level. Engliš 
made himself the spokesman for that view1 9. 
Rasin's hopes and plans, however, went far beyond mere stabilization. For 
him, the strength of the crown was an „index of the nationality vitality". It 
was the litmus test of the practicality of building a Czechoslovak statě in Cen­
tral Europe. In particular, he resented the fact that the Czechoslovak crown 
followed the German mark in its fluctuations, and he hoped to untie the crown 
from the mark in international money markets. In order to secure the existence 
of the country and to increase the value of its currency, Rašín repeatedly called 
upon his countrymen to make sacrifices and to return to a life of „republican 
simplicity", which he equated with American „puritanism". Rašín helped to 
popularize an idea that was to become a hallmark of the Czech self-image in the 
first republic, námely that the country was „an island" of stability in a turbulent 
region of Europe and that it could be preserved only by the dedication of people 
„who love this statě and want to secure and build its independence" 2 0. 
It is only in the light of Rasin's ideas and values that the deflationary policy 
of 1922 can be understood. Although Rašín did not return to the Ministry of 
Finance until October 1922, the change of governments in September 1921 
already signaled the resurgence of Rasin's influence and the adoption of financial 
policies with which he was in füll agreement2 1. The government embarked on a 
resolute program to balance the budget and to reduce State expenditures. In the 
year between November 1921 and October 1922 it cut the amount of money in 
circulation by two billion crowns, i. e. 15 "/o22. This sharply deflationary policy, 
coming at a time when other countries in Central Europe were caught in spiraling 
Inflation, drove up the value of the crown on the Zürich exchange from its low 
of 5. 1 Centimes in October 1921 to a high of 19.2 Centimes in October 1922. 
Already in the latě summer of 1921 the crown cut loose from the German mark 
and subsequently increased and maintained its value while the mark steadily 
sank to its valueless condition of 1923. The strength of the crown vis-á-vis the 
mark was a source of great pride and satisfaction to Czechoslovak patriots. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate of the crown could not multiply almost four-
fold in the space of a year without severely dislocating Czechoslovak foreign 
trade. As exports plummeted in 1922, factories reduced production or simply 
shut down, and unemployment rose to the highest level it reached before the 
great depression of the 1930's. Despite efforts to reduce prices of goods and 
— W e i r i c h , Marko: Staré a nové Československo [Die alte u. die neue Tschecho­
slowakei]. Prague 1939, p. 282. 
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Services, the cuts in wages and salaries were even greater, and real income 
declined2S. 
When Rašín returned as minister of finance in October 1922 in the first 
government under Premier Antonín Švehla, Rašín would promise only more of 
the same. In his important Pardubice speech in December 1922 Rašín described 
his vision of Czechoslovakia as „the first among the small states, the first among 
equals, but still the first". Such a goal for one's nation was not chauvinism but 
rather „true democracy". In glowing terms he revealed his hope of minting gold 
ducats with St. Wenceslas on one side and the Czech lion on the other. That 
would really give the people something worth saving. It would conclusively 
demonstrate that „we are an independent sovereign State" 24. Not everyone shared 
Rasin's commitment to the glories of the State and the nation at the cost of severe 
economic dislocation. By the beginning of 1923 he was probably the most hated 
politician in the country. On January 5, 1923, a deranged young leftist shot 
Rašín, who died after a six-week struggle for life. Rasin's death marked the end 
of the most extreme phase of the deflationary policy, although the generál policy 
continued under his successor, Bohdan Bečka, who was Rasin's brother-in-law 
and a vice-president of the Živnostenská Bank 2 5. 
The politics of deflation marked the climax of the period when the Zivnobank 
won windfall profits from governmental efforts to secure the State. The reserves 
of the bank grew proportionately in value as the money supply decreased. By 
1922 the economic crisis in Austria had effectively destroyed the value of 
Austrian currency, and the Zivnobank exploited the strength of the Czechoslovak 
crown in order to buy up shares of Czechoslovak industries that had remained in 
Viennese hands 2 6 . In that respect, the deflationary policy was consistent with 
the „nosttification" program. But within Czechoslovakia tight money policies 
provoked the bankruptcies of weäker banks and industrial enterprises, and the 
stronger financial institutions — led by the Zivnobank — exploited the Situation 
in order to undercut competition and to spread their influence throughout the 
industrial sphere. Between 1921 and 1923 the Zivnobank's shares in industrial 
consortiums and syndicates increased in value by a factor of 2.3, from 21.7 
million crowns to 51.7 million, and the bank simultaneously strengthened its 
control over certain other financial institutions2 7. At least until 1923 the building 
of the Czechoslovak State was tantamount to the building of the Živnostenská 
Bank. 
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I I : 1923—1934 
From 1923 Czechoslovakia enjoyed considerably more political and monetary 
stability than in the founding years of the republic. The Czechoslovak national 
coalition under Premier Švehla remained intact until the spring of 1926. From 
1923 to 1934 the crown hovered between 15.3 and 16.4 Centimes on the Zürich 
exchange. The crisis atmosphere faded as the young statě seemed to become more 
secure domestically and internationally. Under those conditions the competing 
interests of various social groups among the Czech population once again began 
to assert themselves. The strengest political evidence of that process came in 1926 
with the dissolution of Svehla's government over the twin issues of agricultural 
tariffs and clerical salaries. It was also in the mid-1920's that the concept of the 
Castle assumed greater political significance than it had previously possessed. The 
question facing Jaroslav Preiss and the bank he directed was how they would 
align themselves when the range of political possibilities was broader and the 
differences more subtle. 
In December 1930 the Prager Presse published an article celebrating Preiss's 
sixtieth birthday in which it commented on the earlier contributions of the 
Živnostenská Bank to the founding and the development of the republic. Con-
cerning Preiss, the páper noted: „His plans could be fulfilled only in close 
connection with politics. This was later highly rewarding, for the Živnostenská 
Bank was the statě bank in the first years of the republic, always prepared to 
help the statě treasury in its difficulties, but also seeking and finding gratitude 
and reward for this helpfulness. This relationship naturally had to be liquidated 
later, and this liquidation led to all kinds of resentments and frictions. It created 
a rift that splits our financial Community and also our economic life." The páper 
went on to observe that although Preiss was a powerful hater it would be more 
constructive to forget old resentments28. The Prager Presse was a semi-official 
organ of the statě and was regarded as a mouthpiece for the Castle and par­
ticularly for Beneš. The article is therefore a reliable indication of the frictions 
that had developed between Preiss and the Živnostenská Bank on the one hand 
and the Castle on the other. 
The basic problém was that the ongoing process of state-building made it 
increasingly difficult always to harmonize the interests of the nation with those 
of the bank. Engliš retained the confidence of Masaryk even while his articles 
and lectures made him increasingly unpopulär at the Zivnobank. In 1925 a 
debatě arose about the proposed creation of a National Bank, which would 
govern monetary policy in place of the Bank Office of the Ministry of Finance, 
which was still a National-Democratic preserve. Engliš welcomed the National 
Bank, explaining that it would spell the end of the deflationary policy which 
had remained a potential threat to business activity. Characterizing deflation as 
the „upward reevaluation of finance capital", which threatened to provoke 
generál economic collapse, Engliš emphasized that the National Bank would 
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herald an „epoch of stabilization" 29. But the Zivnobank had profited from the 
deflationary policy, and the creation of the National Bank threatened to diminish 
its influence over monetary policy. After Engliš returned as minister of finance 
in December 1925, it was rumored that the Zivnobank tried to Sabotage Englis's 
efforts to float a new State loan within Czechoslovakia30. Nevertheless, there 
were also too many common interests, and compromise was the order of the day 
between the Zivnobank and Englis's Finance Ministry. The National Bank went 
into Operation in 1926 but with several representatives from the Zivnobank 
circle among its directors3 1. In 1927 Engliš sponsored a tax reform law par­
ticularly favorable to the interests of the bank, and thereby won the praise of 
the bank in its annual report 3 2 . If the bank was no longer so influential as it 
had been in the days of Rašín, it was still a very powerful political and economic 
force. 
Despite mounting friction Preiss functioned in the latě 1920's as a political 
ally of the Castle. The Zivnobank's investment policy of concentrating on heavy 
industry created common interests between the Castle and the bank in the late 
1920's. The Castle desired a liberal trade policy in order to strengthen the 
political ties with Austria as well as with the other states of the Little Entente. 
By the late 1920's Czechoslovak heavy industry was forced also to search for 
markets abroad, and the Zivnobank became more interested in reducing tariffs 
than it had been in the early years of the republic. But the Agrarians were deter-
mined to maintain high agricultural tariffs, and they also used their dominance 
in the government to further the interests of the Agrarian Bank 3 3. Preiss had 
economic reasons enough for striking an alliance with the Castle. And Preiss's 
Cooperation was even more valuable to the Castle after he personally assumed 
leadership of the Central Federation of Czechoslovak Industrialists in 1929. 
In the same years Preiss was also a personal confidant of Masaryk. The 
president relied on Preiss for financial advice and for assistance in raising money 
for Masaryk's disposition fund, which financed various presidential projects34. 
In the same years Preiss tried to move the National-Democratic party closer 
to the center of the political spectrum and therefore into a better working 
relationship with the Castle. Kramar's leadership was a growing liability for the 
party inasmuch äs his political philosophy and his personal resentment of 
Masaryk's and Benes's success led him into reactionary and untenable positions. 
During a brief flurry of fascist activity in 1926, Kramar's support of extremist 
attacks on the Castle were all too obvious. Already in 1925 a group of pro-Castle 
members of the party had split off to form the National Workers'party under 
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the leadership of Jaroslav Stránský and his newspaper, Lidové noviny, became 
one of the pillars of the Castle. 
Realizing that the National-Democratic party was becoming increasingly 
impotent, Preiss and his chief lieutenant in political af f airs, F. X. Hodáč, attemp-
ted to fashion a more respectable public image for the party. It was reported 
that in 1926 Preiss tried vainly to oust the editor of the party's chief newspaper, 
Národní listy. Instead, Preiss himself had to resign from the board of directors 
of the newspaper3 5. But that setback was only temporary. Preiss and Hodáč, 
who was the generál secretary for the Central Federation of Czechoslovak In­
dustrialists, aligned themselves with moderates in the party known as the 
„Democratic Middle", increased their holdings in the company that published 
the party's newspaper, and eventually forced the conservatives from their 
editorial positions. This was doně with the füll knowledge and approval of the 
Castle, which was kept informed about the power struggle within the National-
Democratic party. Preiss also promoted mediation in the dispute between 
Kramář and Beneš in the hopes that an agreement would associate the National-
Democratic party more dosely with the centers of political power in the country. 
Kramar's abstinence doomed those efforts to failure3 6. 
The Cooperation between Preiss and the Castle occurred in years of economic 
prosperity and financial stability. In late 1928 the government decided to remove 
all restrictions on the flow of currency across the frontiers, and the country 
went formally onto the gold standard in 19293 7. The potential effects of the 
Wall Street Crash were not immediately apparent after October 1929. When 
Preiss forecast economic difficulties in May 1930, he was received in some 
circles with disbelief, but by December 1930 it was apparent that Preiss's fears 
were being realized3 8. As the country sank ever deeper into the depression in 
late 1931 and 1932, the ties between Preiss and the Castle were tested in new 
ways. Preiss outspokenly advocated a deflationary policy of maintaining a 
balanced budget and curtailing statě expenditures by cutting the salaries of statě 
employees39. The Castle apparently accepted those ideas, which became official 
government policy. As the depression continued, however, Opposition to the 
orthodox economic philosophy of Preiss grew. Calls mounted for more cen-
tralized economic planning, particularly among the parties of the moderate left, 
which were most dosely identified with the Castle4 0. Moreover, it became 
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apparent that Preiss and Hodáč were not aligning the National-Democratic 
party so close to the Castle as some had expected4 1. 
Although the depression increasingly strained the relationship of Preiss with 
the Castle, the acid test of that association was the ability to cooperate in defense 
of the republic. Within hours after the discovery of the Austro-German plans to 
form a customs union in March 1931, Preiss's residence was the scene of a 
meeting that included Masaryk; Beneš; Engliš; Hodáč; Vilém Pospíšil, the 
director of the National Bank; Rudolf Beran, general-secretary of the Agrarian 
party; and Bohumír Bradáč, the Agrarian minister of agriculture4 2. When the 
news leaked to the press, Preiss tried to portray the meeting as a purely social 
occasion and noted that the genius of democratic government allowed leaders of 
conflicting political viewpoints to remain personal friends43. But such a meeting 
at such a time could not have been purely social, and it was obvious that loyalty 
to the Czechoslovak statě still took precedence over particularistic interests. 
Through the summer of 1931 Austria, Germany, and even Britain slipped ever 
more deeply into the financial crisis while Czechoslovakia remained relatively 
stable. The crown grew in importance as an international medium of payment, 
but the decline of Czechoslovak exports required remedial action. In October a 
meeting of Premier Udržal, Beneš, Preiss, and other financial leaders ended with 
public assurances that the crown was in no danger4 4. Nevertheless, the govern­
ment soon introduced an increasingly stringent program of exchange controls4 5. 
It was obvious that Preiss remained a key adviser for the formulation of govern­
ment policy. 
If the Castle is defined as a group of interests that were willing to subordinate 
other concerns to the development of a liberal republic and an advanced social 
welfare systém in Czechoslovakia, Jaroslav Preiss's actions in the years between 
1923 and 1934 qualify him for membership to a limited degree. Certainly he 
could not be included among the members of the innermost circle of the Castle. 
The conflicting interests between the statě and the Živnostenská Bank, coupled 
with Preiss's loyalty to his bank, prevented that. But Preiss perceived that it 
was in the interests of the bank and of the National-Democratic party to be 
identified with the broad middle of the political spectrum, and he was willing 
to compromise in order to reach that goal. The question was how far he would 
go. The twin challenges of the continuing depression and the threat from Nazi 
Germany eventually provided the answer. 
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I I I : 1934—1938 
Although the depression did not strike Czechoslovakia as quickly as it did 
other Central European states, its füll force descended on the country by 1932 
and 1933. According to official statistics, unemployment reached a peak of 
920,000 in February 1933, and in the same year total industrial production feil 
to 6 0 % of what it had been in 19294 6. At least until the autumn of 1933 Preiss 
could approve the government's course in dealing with the depression, which 
consisted basically in cutting State expenditures in order to balance the budget 
in the face of declining revenues. Briefly in 1932 it appeared that a minority 
dement within the Agrarian party urged devaluation of the currency, but the 
Agrarian premiér of the country and the generál director of the Agrarian Bank 
publicly insisted that the value of the crown would be maintained4 7. When the 
United States devalued the dollar in April 1933, the directors of the Czechoslovak 
National Bank stated that no changes would occur with the crown 4 8. Through 
1933 newspapers of diverse political philosophies celebrated the crown as one 
of the strongest currencies in Europe 4 9 . 
By the autumn and winter of 1933—1934, however, a new debatě arose about 
economic policy. In a speech in November 1933 Preiss mentioned current 
negotiations between agrarian and industrial interests within Czechoslovakia, 
which were aimed at encouraging industrial exports through a policy of lowering 
the country's agricultural tariffs50. That action would have been fully in line 
with the Castle's foreign policy, for Benes's hopes of binding the states of the 
Little Entente through closer trade relations had long been sabotaged by the 
Czechoslovak Agrarians' insistence on high agricultural tariffs. But other disputes 
were occurring behind the scenes, as was evident in a public attack on Preiss in 
Přítomnost, which was closely identified with the Castle5 1. 
According to a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
Czechoslovak missions abroad, both Premier Jan Malypetr and Beneš concluded 
by the end of 1933 that the statě budget could not be cut further. Relying on 
Englis's analysis that the de facto value of gold had risen by one-third since 
1929, the government decided to cut the gold content of the crown by one-sixth 
and theorized that the other sixth would be covered by the previously adopted 
economies52. Devaluation became law on February 17, 1934. At the same time, 
Engliš again emerged from private life, this time to become governor of the 
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National Bank, and replaced a man identified with the Živnostenská Bank. The 
National-Democratic party departed from the government and went into par-
liamentary Opposition. The devaluation of the currency was a major reversal 
for Preiss and the interests of the Živnostenská Bank. Given the strong capital 
position of the bank and his own economic philosophy, Preiss resisted devaluation 
with as much ardor as he had supported Rasin's campaign to raise the value of 
the currency in the early 1920's. The devaluation of the crown in February 1934 
graphically marked the end of Preiss's politics of compromise and the beginning 
of open and bitter Opposition to the government and the Castle. 
Since the beginning of the republic all individuals associated with the Castle 
had agreed that the greatest potential danger from abroad was a resurgent Ger-
many intent on reestablishing its hegemony in Central Europe. It has been seen 
that, particularly in the early postwar years, the Živnostenská Bank exploited 
the fear of German influence in order to buy German-owned properties with 
help from the State. Even though the threat posed by Hitler's Germany was 
clear to Czechoslovak leaders, the Nazi experiment also fascinated some of them. 
In the late summer of 1934 Preiss went on an extensive tour through Germany 
in order to observe the National-Socialist revolution for himself. That trip 
naturally made him a target for left-wing writers — Rudé právo later attri-
buted to Preiss the remark: „To be sure Hitler is only a paint dabbler, but if 
we only had such a one for ourselves." 53 Although Preiss did not speak publicly 
about his trip at the time, he subsequently compared Germany's „rebirth" under 
the Nazis with the „Young Germany" movement of the nineteenth Century. 
While stating that he did not agree with Nazi ideas, Preiss believed that Hitler's 
strength lay in his understanding of the German psychology. Hitler knew what 
the Germans wanted. Consequently, Preiss discerned in Hitler's Germany a new 
enthusiasm for self-sacrifice and creative work54. He repeatedly told his own 
countrymen that those individualist values were the only ones that could bring 
Czechoslovakia out of the depression. Without them, governmental actions would 
be of little avail. In defense of Preiss the Prager Tagblatt, which spoke for 
Jewish capital in Czechoslovakia and shared many of Preiss's values, emphasized 
Preiss's dedication to liberal individualism and his Service in the creation of the 
State. Therefore, Preiss could not approve collectivist philosophies or pan-Ger-
man expansionism, such as Nazism represented. But Preiss could legitimately 
admire the populär enthusiasm for hard work, which had long been present in 
Germany55. 
That analysis of Prdss's response to Nazism is essential for understanding his 
political activities within Czechoslovakia during 1934 and 1935. The National 
Democratic party was isolated from the centers of political power after February 
1934, and it was essential for the party to gain a larger populär following if it 
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was again to play an influential political role in the republic. There can be little 
doubt that Preiss encouraged the decision to join with Jiří Stribrny's proto-
fascist National League in order to form the National Union in October 1934. 
Preiss's longtime collaborator, F. X. Hodáč, led the negotiations for the National 
Democrats and, with Stříbrný, served as the major public figuře in the National 
Union 5 6 . Kramář, still the formal leader of the National Democrats, put his 
stamp of approval onto the project, no doubt in part because Stříbrný was an 
iniplacable personal foe of Beneš. The alliance with Stříbrný placed the National 
Democrats about as far from the circles of the Castle as could be imagined. 
National-Democratic stratégy amounted to a gamble that Stribrny's demagogie 
appeal among Czech voters might prove as strong as was Konrad Henlein's 
among the Sudeten Germans. The lavishly financed campaign of the National 
Union prior to the parliamentary elections of 1935 borrowed heavily from the 
Nazi repertory in Germany. With the slogan „Nothing except the Nation" (Nie 
Než Národ), with a flag identical to that of the Nazis except that a blue N 
was substituted for the black swastika, with the effort to promote Hodáč as a 
Führer-type personality, the National Union tried to stir the most visceral 
Chauvinist emotions of the population. 
But the tactics were too transparent. It was contradictory to attempt to 
promote xenophobia among Czechs by duplicating the well-known tactics of 
Germans. Hodáč, whose eulture and polish made him the very image of upper-
class life, was hardly an appropriate type for a fascist leader. Political opponents 
characterized the National Union as little more than a front Organization for 
Zivnobank interests and aecused Preiss of wanting to build a „gold international" 
of capitalists. The Agrarian party's Venkov attacked the leaders of the party as 
„cynics who shrink from nothing that serveš their political interests"5 7. Com-
peting for essentially the same voters, General Radola Gajda's National Com­
munity of Fascists proclaimed: „We have nothing in common with the ,National 
Union', with the Hodáč-Preiss clique, or with Stříbrný, Locher, and Company." 5 8 
Hodáč and Stříbrný optimistically entertained hopes for a sweeping electoral 
victory. When the National Union was able to increase the number of its 
deputies only from fifteen to seventeen, they refused to serve as parliamentary 
deputies. The alliance had won only six percent of the vote. 
The parliamentary elections of May 1935 confirmed the impotence of a once-
proud party. The National Union graphically demonstrated its own political 
isolation in December 1935 in the presidential élection that made Beneš Masaryk's 
successor. After the collapse of a hasty effort to build a coalition against Beneš, 
the National Union was the only parliamentary group actually to vote for 
Benes's erstwhile Opponent59. But the Zivnobank still wielded great economic 
power even if its political influence had largely evaporated. Throughout the 
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depression years the bank continued to pay dividends although it did have to 
reduce the amount from the levels reached in the late 1920's. The rearmament 
program that began in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1930's brought new profits to 
the bank inasmuch as its investments were concentrated in heavy industry. As 
Western investors rushed to seil their holdings in Czechoslovak industry in the 
late 1930's, the Zivnobank, like other Czech banks, endeavored to acquire the 
shares at bargain prices6 0. Demonstrating its wealth and strength, the Zivnobank 
built an imposing new headquarters building during the depression years. The 
annual speeches of Preiss to the stockholders of the Živnostenská Bank and to 
the Central Federation of Czechoslovak Industrialists were still eagerly awaited 
for their analyses of the economic Situation. 
During the last years of the republic Preiss never wavered in his economic 
philosophy. Among financiers and industrialists the second devaluation of the 
crown in September 1936 met with more ambivälence than had the first devalu­
ation. But the attempt to increase taxes on those industries that were profiting 
from rearmament only solidified Preiss's Opposition to the course that economic 
policy had taken since 1934 6 1. He firmly resisted any movement toward a govem-
ment-directed economy and believed that „real prosperity" could develop only 
in the private sphere and not as a result of government expenditures62. Always 
an individualist, he argued: „Collective responsibility is no responsibility at all 
because in that context in the final analysis no one is responsible."*3 The political 
Systems in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union he characterized as „children of 
the same spirit". Labeling them both „socialism", he defended „democracy" as 
the only (and better) alternative6 4. The man who had toyed with Marxism in 
his own student days had long since abandoned his youthful infatuations. 
Preiss obviously had little sympathy for Czechoslovakia's rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union. The National-Democratic withdrawal from the coalition in 
February 1934 had removed the last major obstacle within Czechoslovakia to 
the de jure recognition of the Soviet Union, which had followed within four 
months. Nor did Preiss support the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of alliance, which 
Beneš had signed in Moscow just three days before the 1935 parliamentary 
elections. In these policy differences with the Castle, Preiss maintained the same 
anti-Soviet and anti-socialist viewpoints that he had held since the foundation 
of the republic. Masaryk and Beneš had long hoped to establish formal relations 
6 0
 K r á l , Václav: Otázky hospodářského a sociálního vývoje v českých zemích 1938— 
1945 [Fragen der wirtschaftlichen u. sozialen Entwicklung in den böhmischen Län­
dern]. 3 vols. Prague 1957—59, vol. 2, pp. 10—11. 
6 1
 Official explanations tied the devaluation of the crown to that of the French franc. 
Central European Observer, September 16, 1936. For Preiss's criticism of taxation 
policy, see: Národní listy, March 21, 1937. — Prager Presse, March 21, 1937. 
6 2
 Národní listy, March 21, 1937. — Prager Presse, March 21, 1937. At another time 
Preiss succinctly expressed his viewpoint in the remark: „The belief that state-orga-
nized production can secure the prosperity of a nation is a utopia." Prager Tagblatt, 
June 15, 1938. 
6 3
 Národní listy, March 21, 1937. — Präger Presse, March 21, 1937. 
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with the Soviet Union but had been held in check by a combination of domestic 
and international considerations in the 1920's. The onslaught of the depression 
and the rise of Nazism in Germany tipped the balance, however, and allowed 
the Castle to effect policies that the conservatives could no longer prevent. 
Preiss himself began to redefine some of his ideas on foreign policy in the mid-
1930's. From being a founder of the republic and a participant in the effort to 
reduce the influence of German and Austrian finance in Czechoslovakia, Preiss 
began publicly to advocate friendlier relations with Germany by 1937. In 
actuality, Benes's French orientation had nevěr enjoyed the füll support of the 
Czechoslovak financial Community, and already in the late 1920's Preiss had 
called for friendlier relations with those countries in Central Europe that were 
Czechoslovakia's major trading partners 6 5. By the late 1930's Preiss made little 
attempt to conceal his criticisms of Benes's foreign policy. Preiss repeatedly 
reminded his listeners that Czechoslovakia was a small statě dependent on the 
export trade and therefore vulnerable to the attitudes of its neighbors u. He was 
clearly sceptical about efforts to redirect Czechoslovak foreign trade overseas 
and away from other countries in Central Europe. Whereas Germany, Austria, 
and Hungary had accounted for 4 7 % of Czechoslovak foreign trade in 1929, 
their share dropped to 2 4 % by 1937. But the real value of Czechoslovak imports 
and exports in 1937 was only about 4 0 % of what it had been in 192957. It 
seemed vain to hope that American and Asian countries could replace Czecho­
slovakia's natural trading partners in Central Europe. 
In his speeches in the late 1930's Preiss always stressed the need for realistic 
analysis rather than wishful thinking in the formulation of foreign policy. He 
clearly believed Benes's stratégy to be outdated. Before Ostrava industrialists in 
May 1937, Preiss observed: „In this international process let us travel the paths 
that have been shown us, for example by the Swiss, the paths that obtain for 
us friends everywhere, or at least do not create enemies for us anywhere . . . . 
While preserving all the sympathies that we have for those who contributed to 
the work of our liberation, we must seek paths not only to them, but also to an 
attachment to, or an inclination towards, or at least a toleration by all nations." 6 8 
A year later in June 1938 Preiss was even more specific about his hopes for an 
understanding with Germany: „. . . while maintaining our loyalty to our alliés 
and especially our genuine sympathies for the French and English people we 
desire just as genuinely a friendly relationship to all European states, especially 
to Germany and Italy with whom we are bound by old cultural and economic 
relations." ** But Preiss also emphasized his loyalty to the Czechoslovak statě and 
its soverdgnty and independence. The question was how it could best be 
P r e i s s , Jaroslav: O vývoji a úkolech československého průmyslu [Über die Ent­
wicklung und die Fragen der tschechoslowakischen Industrie]. Prague 1928, p. 29. 
Prager Presse, March 21, 1937. — Národní listy, March 21, 1937; May 16, 1937. 
Přehled hospodářského vývoje 358, 364—365. 
Národní listy, May 16, 1937. 
Prager Tagblatt, June 15, 1938. — Venkov, June 15, 1938. — Präger Presse, June 15, 
1938. 
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preserved. Discounting the likelihood of war in the near future, Preiss hoped that 
„Czechoslovakia will not become the object of international negotiations, because 
parties who do not know us well would then be making decisions about us, and 
they would not forget their own interests in the process." 7 0 
For some historians it could be tempting to dismiss Preiss's Statements and 
actions in the depression years as simply the self-serving tactics of the generál 
director of Czechoslovakia's largest bank. Certainly the political and economic 
policies that he advocated were those that he thought would further the business 
interests of the Živnostenská Bank. Preiss's calls for further personal sacrifices 
could find little appeal among the thousands of unemployed, especially when 
Preiss himself was the image of personal prosperity. For the cartoonists of Rudé 
právo and other leftist newspapers, he was the prototypical capitalist. But, 
rightly or wrongly, Preiss believed that his ideas were best for the society and 
the country. At the basis of his philosophy lay the conviction that the strength of 
the nation rested on the industriousness and the frugality of the individual. Preiss 
sought to nourish the spirit of individualism — even at the expense of the 
suffering of individuals — in an age that was moving toward ever greater collect-
ivization. 
In the spring of 1938 at the age of 67 Preiss announced his intention of 
retiring from the active directorship of the bank 7 1 . That would have been the 
most convenient course of action for him from the Standpoint of his personal 
interests. But after the Munich Conference and during the German occupation 
Preiss continued to play a leading role in the country's economic affairs. Less 
than two weeks after the German seizure of Prague in March 1939 Preiss told a 
shareholders' meeting of the Zivnobank that the closer ties with the German 
market would probably mean higher production for Czechoslovak industries. 
Then he added: „The fact that the capital that is managed by the bank is nothing 
eise that the savings of the people and, in part, the fuel of our commerce and 
industry obligates the institute to remain true to its calling."7 2 Salvaging the 
salvageable appeared to be the motivation for Preiss's activities in the Protec-
torate. In 1940 and 1941 Preiss and the Živnostenská Bank became the victims 
of newspaper attacks in Prague — the bank still employed Jews, Preiss had 
sent New Year's greetings „to the Jew, Pick" 7 3 . In the generál reckoning of 
accounts after the war Preiss was brought to trial, but he died already in 1946. 
Along with other industrial enterprises and financial institutions, the Zivnobank 
was nationalized in 1945, and its former headquarters now houses the State 
Bank of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 
7 0
 I b i d e m . 
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IV 
The purpose of this páper has been to test a definition of the Castle through 
an analysis of the relationship of Jaroslav Preiss and the Živnostenská Bank 
with the circles around Masaryk and Beneš. There must be a tentative nature to 
the conclusions inasmuch as the major Prague archives are not yet open for 
generál historical research for the entire period of the first republic. Nevertheless, 
the available documentation and the existence of a wide variety of newspaper 
reports already supply a great deal of information. It is possible that additional 
documentary evidence in the future will merely confirm the generál outlines of 
existing evidence. 
If the Castle was that group of leaders in Czechoslovak political, financial, 
and intellectual life that followed Masaryk's and Benes's vision of the republic, it 
is possible to include even Jaroslav Preiss in the group until the depression years. 
To be sure, the social ideas of Masaryk and Beneš were considerably to the left 
of Preiss's. But the early years of the republic witnessed a closing of ranks among 
Czechs of various socio-economic backgrounds and ideological values for the 
purpose of securing the new statě. Only the national minorities and the com-
munists stood clearly outside the new order. As conflicting economic interests 
fragmented the Czech national coalition in the mid-1920's, Preiss aligned himself 
generally with the Castle, for it was clear that more was to be won for the 
Zivnobank and the National-Democratic party through Cooperation than in 
outright Opposition. That policy continued through the early depression years 
until Preiss lost in the debatě about the devaluation of the crown in February 
1934. Thereafter, the Castle led Czechoslovak policy along a course that deviated 
ever more from Preiss's liberal economic and anti-Soviet philosophy. The Na­
tional-Democratic party entered a political alliance with Jiří Stribrny's anti­
Castle movement. In the last years of the republic Preiss grew ever more vocal 
in his critique of the Castle's foreign and domestic policies, and he blamed the 
debacle of 1938—1939 at least in part on Benes's decisions. Preiss and his bank 
therefore moved from practical identification with the Castle in the early years 
of the republic to outright Opposition by the mid-1930's. In broader terms that 
signified a growing conflict between high finance and the political leadership of 
the country. The close Cooperation of Czech leaders in various spheres had been 
essential for the founding of the republic. Cooperation was also indispensable for 
its preservation. The split between the Zivnobank and the Castle under the 
impact of the depression and the threat from Nazi Germany was therefore an 
indication of some internal dissolution even before foreign powers cooperated at 
Munich to destroy the first Czechoslovak republic. 
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R E S Ü M E E 
Jeder Zeitungsleser in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik wußte, daß 
der Begriff „die Burg" auf die politischen Kräfte um den Präsidenten T. G. 
Masaryk hinwies. Aber es war nicht immer klar, wer zu diesen Kräften gehörte 
und wer nicht, von wem die Politik der „Burg" bestimmt wurde, oder sogar was 
diese Politik war. Masaryk hat es öffentlich bestritten, daß eine solche Konstellation 
überhaupt existiere, aber er betonte auch, daß er sich verantwortlich fühle, seine 
Ideen und Überzeugungen den Führern der Regierungskoalition und der politi­
schen Parteien gegenüber auszudrücken. Grundsätzlich kann man durch eine Be­
trachtung der politischen und sozialen Ideen Masaryks zu einer Definition der 
„Burg" gelangen. Der Sinn von Masaryks politischer Aktivität lag darin, einen 
selbständigen tschechoslowakischen Staat mit einer liberaldemokratischen Ver­
fassungsform und einem fortschrittlichen sozialen Fürsorgesystem aufzubauen. 
Diejenigen Personen, politischen Parteien oder Interessengruppen, die bereit waren, 
unter Masaryks Führung dieses Ziel zu verfolgen, konstituierten die „Burg". 
Obwohl Masaryk und sein Mitarbeiter Edvard Beneš etwas links von der 
Mitte des politischen Spektrums standen, umfaßte die „Burg" ein breites Spek­
trum. Die Beziehungen zwischen der „Burg" und der tschechischen Finanzwelt 
sind besonders wichtig für eine Analyse des Regierungssystems. Die einflußreichste 
Figur unter den tschechischen Finanzmännern war Jaroslav Preiss. Als General­
direktor der Živnostenská Bank hatte er die Leitung des weitaus größten Finanz­
instituts während der ganzen Zeit der Ersten Republik. Seit 1929 auch der Vor­
sitzende des Zentralen Verbandes tschechoslowakischer Industrieller, übte Preiss 
seinen politischen Einfluß hauptsächlich hinter den Kulissen aus. In der Öffent­
lichkeit war es nicht klar, wie Preiss und seine Bank zur „Burg" standen. Auf der 
einen Seite hatte Preiss enge persönliche Beziehungen zu Masaryk und Beneš, auf 
der anderen Seite wurde er identifiziert mit der National-Demokratischen Partei 
Kárej Kramářs, des erbittertsten Gegners des Präsidenten und des Außen­
ministers. Die Frage, inwieweit Preiss und seine Bank in die Reihen der „Burg" 
eingeordnet werden können, stellt eine gute Probe für die Elastizität des Konzepts 
der „Burg" dar. 
Auf Grund von tschechischen Zeitungen und Dokumenten von bestimmten 
Ministerien lassen sich drei Perioden in der Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwi­
schen Preiss und der „Burg" feststellen. In den Gründungsjahren der Republik bis 
1923 arbeiteten Preiss und seine Bank sehr eng mit der Regierung zusammen. Der 
Živnostenská Bank brachte der Versuch, die neue Republik vom deutschen und 
österreichischen Finanzwesen so unabhängig wie möglich zu machen, große Ge­
winne ein. In den folgenden Jahren zwischen 1923 und 1934 traten die politischen 
und sozial-ökonomischen Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen tschechischen 
Parteien stärker hervor. Innerhalb der National-Demokratischen Partei übte 
Preiss seinen Einfluß dahingehend aus, daß die Partei wenigstens ein korrektes 
Verhältnis zu den politischen Machtfaktoren, besonders der „Burg", besaß. Er 
wußte, daß für seine Bank mehr in Zusammenarbeit gewonnen werden konnte 
als in irrationaler Opposition. Der Wendepunkt kam im Februar 1934 mit der 
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Abwertung der tschechoslowakischen Krone. Diese Entscheidung bedeutete eine 
schwere Niederlage für Preiss und die Nationaldemokratie. Die Partei trat aus 
die Regierung aus und Preiss unterstützte den Versuch, eine neue Volksbewegung 
nach dem Muster der NSDAP ins Leben zu rufen. Die parlamentarischen Wahlen 
vom Mai 1935 zeigten, wie machtlos die Nationaldemokraten geworden waren. 
Aber in ökonomischer Hinsicht blieben die Zivnobank und ihr Leiter sehr ein-
flußreich. In den letzten vier Jahren der Republik äußerte Preiss immer offener 
seine Kritik an der Innen- und Außenpolitik Benešs. Von einem relativ engen 
Mitarbeiter der „Burg" wurde Preiss zu einem ausgesprochenen Gegner. Ange-
sichts der Interessen, die er repräsentierte, zeigt der Fall Preiss eine gewisse 
Dissolution innerhalb tschechischer Führungskreise, noch bevor ausländische Mächte 
die Republik von außen her zerstörten. 
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